WTO law issues of emissions trading by Holzer, Kateryna
  
Working Paper No. 2016/1| April 2016 
 
 
 
WTO law issues of emissions 
trading  
 
Kateryna Holzer  
 
 
Abstract 
Based on existing research in the interface of emissions trading schemes (ETSs) and WTO 
law, the paper looks more closely at the design elements of an ETS that are most 
vulnerable to a WTO challenge, including border adjustment on importation and exportation, 
recycling of revenues and cross-border linking. The analysis of WTO consistency of various 
ETS regulatory components reveals significant legal uncertainty. One explanation is that an 
ETS is not yet fully established as a regulatory tool. It does not have a fixed design and its 
design elements vary significantly with a scheme. Moreover, ETS-related issues have never 
been raised in WTO disputes. This makes it hard to predict with confidence the outcome of 
scrutiny of an ETS by a WTO adjudicative body. In this respect, the availability of 
environmental and/or health exceptions for justification of ETS-related measures is of great 
importance. 
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WTO law issues of emissions trading 
Kateryna Holzer1 
 
1. Introduction  
An emission trading scheme (ETS) is a climate policy instrument, which sets a limit on 
the amount of emissions permissible for a company, thereby putting a price on 
emissions and stimulating emissions reductions. Because the number of distributed 
emissions allowances is lower than the one demanded by companies covered by an 
ETS, emissions allowances constitute a scarce resource, which increases the total costs 
of production. Consequently, companies participating in an ETS have a less 
advantageous position vis-a-vis competitors that are not participating in an ETS. 
The interaction of emissions trading with the rules of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) begins with an introduction of regulatory measures or design features of an ETS 
that are aimed at mitigating the competitive disadvantages of participating companies. 
Such measures have also a clear environmental objective of preventing carbon leakage, 
the situation where the total amount of global emissions increases due to the expansion 
of emissions-intensive production elsewhere.2 There are a variety of measures that can 
be taken for these purposes. They include free allocation of emissions allowances, 
income-supporting recycling of ETS revenues, use of border adjustment measures etc. 
As a result, an ETS does not represent a single measure but a complex system of various 
design elements and flanking support schemes.  
Cost increases relating to ETS ‘indirectly’ raise issues under WTO law if a higher 
costs burden is placed on foreign producers, as preventing discrimination is a major 
objective of the WTO legal system. By contrast, a ‘direct impact’ of an ETS on trade in 
such situations is less obvious because trading in emission allowances does not 
                                                          
1 Kateryna Holzer is a post-doc research fellow with the NCCR Trade Regulation, World Trade 
Institute, the University of Bern. The author is grateful to Stefan Weishaar, the editor of the Research 
Handbook of Emissions Trading (Edward Elgar, forthcoming) for his valuable comments and suggestions 
on the extended version of this paper. All errors remain the sole responsibility of the author.  
2 See P Wooders et al. (2009) ‘Border Carbon Adjustment and Free Allowances: Responding to 
Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns’, OECD, SG/SD/RT(2009)8, at 8-11. See also H van Asselt et al. 
(2009) ‘Addressing Leakage Competitiveness in US Climate Policy: Issues Concerning Border 
Adjustment Measures’, Climate Strategies, at 9, and R Ismer (2010) ‘Mitigating Climate Change through 
Price Instruments: An Overview of the Legal Issues in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’, in C 
Herrmann and J Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag) at 211-212. 
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constitute trade in its traditional sense. Traded are not conventional goods and services, 
but emissions allowances, which essentially represent rights to certain amounts of 
emissions.  
 While the legal status of emissions allowances under WTO law is disputable3  and 
will remain so until it is clarified in a WTO dispute, one element appears certain: 
irrespective of whether emissions allowances fall within the scope of the WTO 
Agreement or not, restrictions on the eligibility of emissions allowances for compliance 
with an ETS requirement and also other design features of emissions trading have the 
potential to affect international trade indirectly, through an impact on trade in goods and 
services, and as such get in conflict with the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and/or the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).   
This paper looks more closely at the design elements of an ETS that are most 
vulnerable to a WTO challenge.   
 
2. Free allocation of emissions allowances  
The initial stage of emissions trading is the allocation of emissions allowances, whereby 
a government distributes emissions allowances to firms participating in an ETS. There 
are several ways for the distribution of emissions allowances, most prominent are free 
allocation or auctioning.4 Free allocation reduces the financial burden of an ETS for 
domestic firms and thus is widely used as an approach to addressing competitiveness 
and carbon leakage concerns under existing national cap-and-trade systems.5  
While the free allocation of emissions allowances may help prevent carbon 
leakage,6 it negatively affects the state budget,7reduces incentives for firms to reduce 
                                                          
3 Some commentators put them in the regulatory ambit of the GATT (see e.g. J Button (2008), 
‘Carbon: Commodity or currency? The case for an international carbon market based on the currency 
model’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, vol. 32, at 575–577); others subject them to the GATS 
disciplines (see e.g. R Howse (2009) ‘World Trade Law and Renewable Energy: The Case of Non-Tariff 
Barriers’, UNCTAD, at 15-16). 
4 In the 3rd phase of EU ETS (2012-2020), roughly half of the allowances is being auctioned. 
For instance, all electricity generators (with some exceptions) are obliged to buy emissions allowances at 
an auction. Yet, the free allocation is still available for carbon-intensive sectors with a significant risk of 
carbon leakage. The free allocation is based on the benchmark of the 10% most efficient EU producers in 
the sector. See I Jegou and L Rubini (2011) ‘The Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of Charge: 
Legal and Economic Considerations’, Transition to a Low Carbon Future Series’ Issue Paper no. 18, 
ICTSD, at 3 and 6. 
5 S Dröge (2009) ‘Tackling Leakage in a World of Unequal Carbon Prices’, Climate Strategies, 
at 46. 
6 There is no conclusive evidence though. See e.g. I Jegou and L Rubini (2011) ‘The Allocation 
of Emission Allowances Free of Charge’, at 21. 
7 It is estimated that the foregone revenues from the free allocation of emissions allowances in 
the 3rd phase of the EU ETS (2012-2020) will constitute 100 billion Euros. See ibid.  
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emissions8 and creates the risk of windfall profits. Concerns have also been raised in the 
literature about the consistency of free allocation of emissions with the WTO subsidy 
and anti-dumping rules.9 They are examined in more detail below.  
 
2.1 Issues arising under the WTO rules on subsidies 
The analysis of the free allocation of emissions allowances under WTO rules begins 
with a consideration of whether the measure constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of 
the WTO Agreement. The WTO definition of a subsidy is contained in Article 1 of the 
WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)10 and consists 
of two parts: (1) a measure must constitute a ‘financial contribution’ by a government or 
any form of ‘income or price support’ and (2) must confer a ‘benefit’. The financial 
contribution by a government is understood as: (1) direct transfers of funds (e.g. loan 
guarantees); (2) fiscal incentives (government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone); 
and (3) provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure or purchase of 
goods.11 In addition, the financial contribution covers situations where a government 
entrusts a private body to provide a financial contribution in any of the three forms or 
provides financial support indirectly (e.g. through a funding mechanism).12 
Based on the fact that, under the free allocation, allowances are distributed for free 
instead of being exchanged for money, it could be argued that the free allocation would 
be a financial contribution by a government in the form of the revenue foregone that 
would otherwise have been due.13 Consequently, the free allocation meets the first part 
                                                          
8 J Hoerner and F Muller (1996) ‘Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a Competitive World’, 
paper prepared for the Swiss Federal Office for Foreign Economic Affairs, at 46. But it could also be 
argued that an emissions allowance, even if a firm received it for free, would still have an opportunity 
cost. It can be sold on the carbon market instead of being used for compliance with ETS and therefore it 
still stimulates its holder to reduce emissions. 
9 See e.g. R Howse (2010) ‘WTO Subsidies Disciplines and Climate Change Mitigation Policies: 
Options for Reconciliation’, paper prepared for the IISD, at 10-11; and I Jegou and L Rubini (2011), ‘The 
Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of Charge’. 
10 The rules governing the use of subsidies are also contained in GATT Art. XVI. The GATT 
and ASCM provisions form an integrated set of rules on subsidies. The ASCM does not however cover 
the use of subsidies in the agricultural sector, which are regulated by the provisions of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
11 ASCM Art. 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii). 
12 ASCM Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
13 Depending on whether an emissions allowance could qualify as a good or service, the free 
allocation of emissions allowances could also acquire the meaning of a provision of goods and services 
under Article 1.1(a)1(iii). I Jegou and L Rubini draw here a parallel to the stumpage arrangements, which 
provided rights to lumber (which was found by the AB to be a good) to Canadian lumber harvesters. See I 
Jegou and L Rubini (2011) ‘The Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of Charge’, at 30-31. Providing 
rights to a good was found by the AB to constitute a financial contribution by government in the form of a 
provision of goods and services. See US-Softwood Lumber IV, AB report, para. 75. Yet, the difference of 
stumpage arrangements to emissions allowances is that the latter provide rights to emissions and not to 
such natural resources or goods as lumber. Since the AB considers a good to be a tangible and 
possessable item, it is difficult to qualify emissions allowances (i.e. rights to pollute) as a good.   
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of the subsidy definition under Article 1.1(a)1(ii) of the ASCM. Next, it could be argued 
that free allocation confers a benefit14 to firms so long as an emissions allowance, which 
was received for free, can always be sold in the market if a firm achieves emissions 
reduction and has no need in the allowance to comply with its emissions quota.15  
Consequently, due to the receipt of the free allowance, a firm gets a better financial 
position than before, which is a benefit.16 That means that the second part of the ASCM 
subsidy definition is also fulfilled.  
The finding that the free allocation of emissions allowances constitutes a 
government financial contribution that confers a benefit to a firm would be enough to 
render the free allocation a subsidy under WTO law. However, it would not be enough 
for the complaining party to win a dispute in the WTO or to justify its unilateral 
imposition of countervailing duties on subsidized imports.17 As long as emissions 
allowances are not provided for free specifically on exportation18 or under the condition 
that a firm would use domestically produced components, the free allocation is unlikely 
to be viewed as a prohibited subsidy.  
However, because the free allowances are usually available only to certain firms or 
industries, namely to those under a significant risk of carbon leakage, the free allocation 
is likely to be viewed as a specific subsidy,19 and as such, could potentially be 
actionable. This means that this measure could successfully be challenged in the WTO, 
and eventually forced to be withdrawn, or could be targeted by trading partners through 
CVDs, if the complaining party (or the CVD-imposing country) could claim adverse 
effects, including material injury to its domestic industry.20In this respect, one could 
                                                          
14 In Canada-Aircraft, when interpreting the meaning of the benefit under this provision, the AB 
noted: ‘the word "benefit", as used in Article 1.1(b), implies some kind of comparison.  This must be so, 
for there can be no "benefit" to the recipient unless the "financial contribution" makes the recipient "better 
off" than it would otherwise have been, absent that contribution.  In our view, the marketplace provides 
an appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether a "benefit" has been "conferred"…’. See 
Canada-Aircraft, AB report, para. 157. 
15 I Jegou and L Rubini (2011) ‘The Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of Charge’, at 22. 
16 Ibid., at 22. See also L Rubini (2013), ‘Subsidies for emissions mitigation under WTO law’, in 
G. Van Calster and D. Prevost (eds), Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO (Edward 
Elgar) at 575-576.  
17 Not every subsidy is illegal under WTO law. The use of government support measures comes 
under legal scrutiny only if they (1) promote exports or support import substitution (ASCM Art. 3) and 
(2) adversely affect the interests of other WTO members, including injury to their industries, impairment 
of their benefits under tariff concessions and serious prejudice to their interests (ASCM Art. 5). 
18 It could be argued that the link to exports could be established based on the fact that the 
government gives allowances for free to those industries that are most carbon-intensive and trade-
exposed. However, the trade exposure is also understood in terms of the dependency on imports. See 
‘Carbon allowance rebates seen as possible export subsidies’ Inside U.S. Trade (26 June 2009) at 2. 
19 A subsidy is deemed to be specific when it is not sufficiently broadly available throughout an 
economy. See US-Upland Cotton, Panel report, para. 7.1142. 
20 ASCM Art. 5.  
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argue that the case of free allocation of emissions allowances to specific industries has 
an analogy to the free access to natural resources in the Lumber case. In the US-
Softwood Lumber IV dispute, the claim of subsidy was based on the fact that the 
companies did not pay ‘adequate remuneration’ to the government for the access to 
lumber.21 But there is at least one circumstance around the free allocation of emissions 
allowances that makes these cases different. The analogy would be indisputable if 
complaining countries themselves had ETSs in place.22 In that case, such countries, 
especially those with ETSs based on auctioning, might be able to claim that their 
domestic industries buying emissions allowances in an auction are adversely impacted 
by imports from countries where emissions allowances are distributed for free.23 But 
currently there are very few countries, in which domestic producers bear emissions 
costs. For countries with no climate change legislation in place, it would be difficult to 
claim that the free allocation of emissions allowances causes adverse effects to their 
domestic industries, which bear no emissions costs at all.24 Therefore, in our view, the 
risk of disputes that could be brought under the ASCM against the free allocation of 
emissions allowances currently appears to be minimal. 
 
2.2 Issues arising under WTO anti-dumping rules  
A legal issue over the distribution of emissions allowances for free may also arise under 
WTO anti-dumping rules. The free allocation may trigger the initiation of anti-dumping 
procedures by trading partners and lead to the imposition of anti-dumping duties 
(ADDs) on imports coming from countries where producers receive emissions 
allowances for free. It could be argued that the free allocation enables producers to 
charge unusually low prices. Imports originating from such enterprises could then be 
viewed as dumped imports. Under WTO anti-dumping rules, if dumped imports cause 
or threaten material injury to a domestic industry, they can be offset by anti-dumping 
duties charged in addition to the ordinary import duties.25  
Yet, the case of the free allocation of emissions allowances does not easily fall 
within the WTO understanding of dumping. Under the definition of dumping contained 
                                                          
21 R Howse (2010) ‘WTO Subsidies Disciplines and Climate Change Mitigation Policies’, at 
10-11.  
22 K Holzer (2014) Carbon-related border adjustment and WTO law (Edward Elgar) at 212-213. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., at 213. 
25 See GATT Art. II:2 and GATT Art. VI. The imposition of anti-dumping duties is further 
regulated by the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994 (the Anti-Dumping Agreement). 
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in Article VI:1 of the GATT (and Art. 2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement), dumping is a 
situation where the export price of the product is  
 
(a) less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product 
when destined for consumption in the internal market of the exporting country, or, 
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third 
country in the ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin plus a 
reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.  
 
In other words, in all these cases of dumping, the price of the imported product 
does not represent the normal value of the product.26 And the comparison is always 
made with the price at which the like product is sold in the market of the exporting 
country or with the price, which is otherwise related to the exporting country.  
By contrast, when dumping is referred to the case of the free allocation of 
emissions allowances, the comparison is made with the price of the like product in the 
market of the importing country that, for example, distributes allowances through an 
auction. This does not reflect the WTO meaning of dumping and, hence, does not 
provide justification for the imposition of ADDs.27 The mere non-payment of emissions 
costs that results in the lower prices would hardly suffice to make a case for the 
imposition of ADDs. 
And yet, it could be argued that the case of dumping can be made under the 
provisions of Article 2.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, which refers to the situation 
where the comparison with the price in the internal market of the exporting country is 
not possible ‘because of the particular market situation’. The non-payment for 
emissions allowances results in the price of products not reflecting the normal value of 
the good, and therefore the export price cannot be compared to the price in the internal 
market.28 In that situation, the comparison would need to be made with ‘the cost of 
production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for administrative, selling 
and general costs and for profits’ (ASCM Article 2.2) and ‘costs shall normally be 
                                                          
26 The normal value is thus a benchmark, against which the export price is compared in dumping 
cases. 
27 J Pauwelyn (2013) ‘Carbon leakage measures and border tax adjustments under WTO law’, in 
D. Prevost and G. Van Calster (eds.), Research Handbook on Environment, Health and the WTO (Edward 
Elgar) at 505.  
28 P Holmes et al. (2011) ‘Border carbon adjustments and the potential for protectionism’, 
Climate Policy, vol. 11, at 889. 
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calculated on the basis of records kept by the exporter or producer under investigation, 
provided that such records ... reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production 
and sale of the product under consideration’ (ASCM Article 2.2.1.1). It could be argued 
that the costs associated with the production of imported products are not reasonably 
reflected because of the distribution of emissions allowances for free. In this regard, 
Peter Holmes et al. (2011) refer to the anti-dumping procedure initiated against the 
Ukrainian steel some time ago.29 In that case, the dumping resulted from the fact that 
the price of gas in Ukraine was not reasonably reflected in the production costs of 
Ukrainian steel producers and hence in the price of the Ukrainian steel.30 Similarly, in 
the case of the free allocation of emissions allowances, the country with an ETS, which 
is fully based on auctioning of emissions allowances, could argue that the price of 
exports from countries with the free allocation of emissions allowances does not reflect 
the normal value.31 The benchmark for the normal value could be the price in the 
market of the importing country or a third country distributing emissions allowances 
only through auction. The difference between the ‘normal value’ and the actual export 
price would then be a margin of dumping to be offset with anti-dumping duties.32  
Whether the ‘reasonable costs’ argument can establish a solid foundation for the 
imposition of ADDs in the case of non-payment of emissions costs under free allocation 
of emissions allowances in exporting countries can only be tested in future disputes.33 
All that can be said at the moment is that the use of ADDs, like the use of CVDs, for 
leveling the playing field between domestic and foreign producers in the world of 
different emissions costs cannot be excluded.  
 
3. Revenue recycling 
Another feature of an ETS which could be put under WTO law scrutiny is the mode of 
allocation of state revenues from emissions allowances. A government can use revenues 
it receives from the distribution of emissions allowances at an auction in many ways.34 
                                                          
29 See Council Regulation (EC) No 954/2006 of 27 June 2006 imposing definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes, of iron or steel originating in Croatia, Romania, 
Russia and Ukraine. 
30 Until the mid-2000s Ukraine bought gas from Russia at prices which were considerably lower 
than the market price.  
31 P Holmes et al. (2011) ‘Border carbon adjustments and the potential for protectionism’, at 889. 
32 Ibid., at 888-889.  
33 J Pauwelyn (2013) ‘Carbon leakage measures and border tax adjustments under WTO law’, at 
505. 
34 A Baranzini et al. (2000) ‘A future for carbon taxes’, Ecological Economics, vol. 32, at 400.  
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It can allocate the revenues in various social and infrastructure programs (salaries, 
pensions, medical care, army etc.), as it normally does with all other tax revenues. It can 
also use them to enable the economy-wide tax reform through the reduction of other 
taxes, for instance, capital taxes (corporate taxes, personal income rates on interest, 
dividends, capital gains etc.) or labor taxes (payroll, personal income taxes etc.).35 The 
revenues can also be earmarked, i.e. they can be spent to fund climate change and other 
environmental projects.36  
Finally, the revenues can also be recycled (i.e. redistributed) through lump sum 
rebates to low-income households, which are most disadvantaged by increase emissions 
costs.  Or a government may choose to recycle the emissions allowances revenues back 
to firms, particularly to those, which are most vulnerable to competitiveness losses. In 
that case, while the revenue recycling can serve as a tool of preventing carbon 
leakage,37 it will raise issues under the WTO rules on subsidies. Like the WTO law 
analysis of free allocation of emissions allowances, the examination of ETS revenue 
recycling schemes under the WTO legal framework focuses on the question of whether 
a particular mode of revenues allocation subsidizes national producers to the detriment 
of foreign industries, and as such is an actionable subsidy. As already discussed, to 
qualify as an actionable subsidy, a measure must constitute a financial contribution or 
any form of income or price support from a government, must confer a benefit, be 
specific and create adverse effects on foreign industries.  
Based on case law, it could be argued that the recycling of revenues from emissions 
allowances back to the most vulnerable producers may constitute a state financial 
contribution in the form of a direct transfer of funds (ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)) or 
foregone budget revenues (ASCM Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii)).38 Yet, strong objections can be 
raised against this.39 First, under this mode of revenue allocation, same money that was 
collected would be recycled back to the contributing entities (firms), and not the 
revenues from other sources that were collected before and put in the state budget or 
comprising state reserves. Hence, the recycling of emissions allowances revenues back 
                                                          
35 J Carbone et al. (2014) ‘Getting to an Efficient Carbon Tax – How the revenue is used 
matters’, Resources, vol. 185. 
36 In this respect, it is argued that ETSs can be an important source for global and national action 
on climate change. See e.g. A Esch (2013) ‘Using EU ETS Auctioning Revenues for Climate Action: 
What is the Appetite for Earmarking within Specific EU Member States?’ Brief Paper (Germanwatch) at 
6-7. 
37 N Shariff (2012) ‘Enhancing Competitiveness and Addressing Carbon Leakage: A Value 
Added Based Approach to Emissions Pricing System Design’ (University of Bern) at 35. 
38 See e.g. EC and certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft, Panel report, para. 7.1292; US-
Large Civil Aircraft (2nd complaint), AB report, paras. 617, 812, 815; US-FSC (Art. 21.5-EC), AB report, 
para. 104. 
39 N Shariff (2012) ‘Enhancing Competitiveness and Addressing Carbon Leakage’, at 48. 
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to firms looks as a redistribution of funds between private entities rather than a direct 
transfer of funds from the budget.  
Second, even though the allegation of foregone government revenues might be 
correct, one should not forget that such a judgment cannot be taken out of context. As 
Nashina Shariff (2012) rightly put it, ‘[i]n a country where the status quo is not to tax 
emissions at all, which is the normal case, the institution of a charge and rebate system 
should not constitute foregoing government revenue otherwise due, but simply a means 
of taxation that limits the cost impacts of the measure on its industry’.40 For similar 
reasons, it is difficult to argue that such mitigation of ETS impacts on industries confers 
a benefit to the firms, and even more difficult it would be to prove that ETS revenue 
rebates created adverse effects for foreign industries.41  
Nevertheless, certain design elements of a revenues recycling scheme need to be 
included in order to withstand allegations of WTO law-inconsistency. First, an ETS 
revenue recycling scheme needs to be administered so that it can demonstrate a clear 
connection between the revenue received from the allocation of emissions allowances 
and its recycling back to firms.42 This could help address the claim of a direct transfer of 
government funds. Second, if the government revenues under an ETS were used, even 
partially, to fund environmental and climate change projects, this could serve as 
evidence of the environmental rationale of an ETS and constitute an important indicator 
of the neutrality of the system. It would also increase chances for justification of some 
elements of ETS under the environmental exception of GATT Article XX, as discussed 
below.43 Finally, WTO law does not impose obstacles to redistributing revenues as part 
of a national tax reform. Revenues received from climate policy-related charges could 
legally be used to reduce the rates of mandatory social charges, such as health insurance 
premiums, or income taxes.44  
 
4. Border carbon adjustments 
A border carbon adjustment (BCA) is undoubtedly the most controversial of all design 
features of an ETS, seen from the perspective of WTO rules. A BCA is meant to 
equalize emissions costs of domestic and foreign producers. For someone from the field 
                                                          
40  Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., at 50.  
43 K Holzer (2014) Carbon-related border adjustment and WTO law, at 237. 
44  For more on this, see T Cottier et al. (2014) ‘Differential Taxation of Electricity’, a study 
prepared for the Swiss Federal Finance Administration (FFA) and the Swiss Federal Office of Energy 
(SFOE), 18 April 2014, at 60-63.  
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of tax law, a BCA is normal practice, as it puts in effect the destination principle of 
taxation, whereby the ETS requirement applies equally with respect to domestic 
products and imports, on the one side, and emissions allowance rebates can be provided 
to domestic producers on exportation, on the other side.45 However, little clarity exists 
regarding the compatibility of BCAs with obligations under the WTO Agreement. On 
the one hand, it is because they have never been tested in a WTO dispute. On the other 
hand, it is due to the special nature of the measures, which belong to the category of 
non-product related process and production methods (npr-PPMs). BCAs are imposed in 
connection to emissions, which are intangible and cannot be traced in the final 
product.46 The matter becomes even more complex given the fact that emissions result 
from the production process happening abroad. In this respect, BCAs are measures with 
an extraterritorial reach, as they interfere with other countries’ jurisdiction to regulate 
environmental matters and the use of technologies.47 While the use of npr-PPMs 
remains a politically sensitive issue, a more tolerable approach to npr-PPMs is emerging 
in the judicial field. It seems that WTO case law is moving towards the position that 
admits that npr-PPMs are not illegal so long as they apply on a non-discriminatory 
basis.48 In case if they are found to discriminate against imports, they may still be 
justified under the exceptions provided in GATT Article XX for measures taken with 
moral, health, environmental and other public policy objectives. 
 
4.1 The inclusion of imports in an ETS  
One way to equalize emissions costs between domestic and foreign producers 
competing on the market of a country putting an ETS in place is to include imports in 
the ETS. That means that importers will be obliged to surrender emissions allowances, 
if they want to sell products from a sector covered by the ETS. This will follow the 
principle of import-side border tax adjustment. Instead of taxes, however, adjusted will 
                                                          
45 This is, for instance, usual practice for the application of value-added taxes (VAT).  
46 See e.g. S Charnovitz (2002) ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the 
Myth of Illegality’, Yale Journal of International Law, vol. 27, at 62-63.  
47 Besides the coercive effect on policies of other countries, which enjoy sovereign rights and 
regulatory autonomy under international public law, PPMs inflict considerable costs on exporting 
countries. To meet the requirements of an importing country, exporting countries have to make 
investments in technological modernization and upgrading of their standards. It is therefore not surprising 
that PPMs with extraterritorial jurisdiction are opposed, especially by developing countries. See e.g. the 
Statement of Mexico, the complaining party in the Tuna/Dolphin dispute before the panel: US-Tuna 
(Mexico), GATT Panel report (unadopted), para 3.31. 
48 K Holzer (2014) Carbon-related border adjustment and WTO law, at 96-98. See also N 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder et al. (2006) Environment and Trade: A Guide to WTO Jurisprudence (London: 
Earthscan) at 205-218. 
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be costs of emissions allowances. Does it matter for the compliance with the WTO rules 
on border tax adjustment?  
Since only indirect taxes (i.e. taxes applied to products) can be adjusted at the 
border,49 a starting point in the analysis of WTO law legality of BCAs (no matter 
whether import-side or export-side) is the determination of whether the ETS 
requirement to surrender emissions allowances can qualify as an indirect tax. More 
precisely, whether the requirement to surrender emissions allowances is a tax at all, and 
if it is a tax, whether it is an indirect tax. The first question is important because the 
rules on border adjustment vary with the type of the measure. If the ETS requirement is 
a tax (or a charge), when adjusted on importation, it falls under GATT Article III:2 and, 
accordingly, the tax burden for imports must be the same as for the like domestic 
products.50 If it is a domestic regulation, when applied to imports, it falls under the 
provisions of GATT Article III:4 and, accordingly, the treatment of like imported 
products may sometimes be different but never less favourable.51 The second question 
matters because only indirect taxes, i.e. taxes levied on products and not on producers, 
are adjustable.52 
There is no consensus on whether the ETS requirement to surrender emissions 
allowances can qualify as a tax. Referring to the OECD definition of a tax being ‘an 
unrequited payment to the government’ or ‘a compulsory contribution imposed by the 
government for which taxpayers receive nothing identifiable in return’, both Javier De 
Cendra (2006) and Joost Pauwelyn (2007) consider an emissions allowances 
requirement to be a tax eligible for adjustment at the border.53 They submit that an 
emissions allowance requirement can qualify as a tax even if emissions allowances are 
distributed for free, given that allowances always have an opportunity cost.54 This 
contrasts with Lorand Bartels (2011)’ argument that the ETS requirement is a domestic 
                                                          
49 The availability of border adjustment only for indirect taxes follows from the text of the legal 
provisions of GATT Art. II:2(a), Art. VI:4 and Ad Art. XVI. It is also confirmed by the GATT Working 
Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments (L73464, 2 December 1970, BISD 18S797, para. 14).  
50 Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, AB report, at 18 and 22. 
51 Korea-Various Measures on Beef, AB report, para. 137. 
52 This follows from the text of the provisions relevant for border adjustment, including GATT 
Art. II:2(a), Art. VI and Ad Art. XVI. See also GATT Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments,  
para. 14. 
53 J de Cendra (2006) ‘Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax 
Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law’, RECIEL, vol. 15(2) at 136, and J Pauwelyn (2007) ‘U.S. 
Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: the Limits and Options of International Trade 
Law’, Working Paper, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University, at 21-22. 
Also supported by R Ismer and K Neuhoff (2008) ‘International Cooperation to Limit the Use of Border 
Adjustment’, a paper prepared for the Climate Strategies workshop held in Geneva on 10 September 
2008, at 8. 
54 J Pauwelyn (2007) ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns’, at 22. 
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regulation (i.e. a non-fiscal measure), for it cannot be an unrequited payment so long as 
emissions allowances can be sold in the carbon market and bring revenue.55 This echoes 
with the ECJ finding that the ETS requirement constitutes a market-based measure, 
rather than a tax.56  
If the ETS requirement is a domestic regulation (i.e. a non-fiscal measure), the 
discussion about direct and indirect taxes becomes no longer relevant57 because the 
analysis shifts to the examination of the application of the measure. The thorny issue 
here is the likeness of carbon-intensive and low-carbon products, as the non-
discrimination rules (the most favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment (NT) 
principles) governing the application of BCAs to imports are relevant only for like 
products.58 Traditionally, when determining whether products are like, WTO 
adjudicative bodies look at whether the competitive relationship between products is 
strong enough, and whether products are characterized by the same physical 
characteristics, end-uses, consumer preferences and tariff codes.59 Based on this 
traditional ‘like product’ test, it is difficult to refer to the imported steel produced in an 
open hearth process (with a higher GHG emission footprint) and the domestic steel 
produced with the electric arc technology (with a lower GHG emission footprint) as 
unlike products. Yet, the increasing consumer awareness of climate change and their 
growing preferences for products with the low carbon footprint may impact the 
competitive relationship and render carbon-intensive and low-carbon products unlike.60 
                                                          
55 L Bartels (2011) ‘The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations’, 
Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainable Energy Issue Paper no. 6, ICTSD, at 4. 
56 The ECJ did not find the ETS requirement to be a tax for the following reasons. First, a tax has 
a fixed rate, whereas the costs of emissions allowances for a firm vary depending on the number of 
allowances initially allocated for free and the market price of an allowance if the firm purchased 
additional allowances to comply with its obligations under the ETS. Second, unlike a tax, the ETS 
requirement is not primarily intended to generate revenue in the budget. See ECJ Case C-366/10, Air 
Transport Association of America and others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] 
ECR I-1133, paras. 142-144, 147. 
57 Opinions vary as to whether the ETS requirement can be attributed to indirect taxes. For the 
arguments in favour, see J Hoerner and F Muller (1996) ‘Carbon Taxes for Climate Protection in a 
Competitive World’; J Pauwelyn (2007) ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns’; P 
Wooders and A Cosbey (2010) ‘Climate-linked tariffs and subsidies: Economic aspects (competitiveness 
and leakage)’, a paper prepared for the TAIT second conference on ‘Climate Change, Trade and 
Competitiveness: Issues for the WTO’ held in Geneva on 16-18 June 2010. For the arguments against, see 
G Goh (2004) ‘The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border’, 
Journal of World Trade, vol. 38(3); P Low et al. (2010) ‘The interface between the trade and climate 
change regimes: Scoping the issue’, a paper prepared for the TAIT second conference on ‘Climate 
Change, Trade and Competitiveness: Issues for the WTO’ held in Geneva on 16-18 June 2010. 
58 GATT Art. I and Art. III. If the ETS requirement is a regulation, it might also be subject to the 
provisions of the WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). See K Holzer 
(2014) Carbon-related border adjustment and WTO law, at 140-145. 
59 See e.g. EC-Asbestos, AB report, para. 101; Philippines-Distilled Spirits, AB report, paras 119 
and 131. 
60 T Cottier et al. (2014) ‘Differential Taxation of Electricity’, at 32-33. 
14 
 
In that case, the application of BCAs would not trigger a violation of the MFN and NT 
provisions.  
Under present circumstances, however, a more likely scenario is that the use of 
BCAs would need justification under the general exceptions of GATT Article XX.61 
BCAs fit in the scope of paragraph (b), which provides justification for measures 
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, and paragraph (g), which 
exempts from compliance measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources…’. Yet, the major challenge for justification of BCAs is the conditions of the 
chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau requires that a measure does not constitute ‘a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade’. In simple terms it 
means that it would not tolerate any differences in the design and the implementation of 
a measure made in relation to countries, where conditions relevant for the policy 
objective pursued by the measure are the same.62 BCAs should therefore be flexible 
enough to exclude imports from countries that pursue emissions reduction policies, no 
matter whether in the form of an ETS, a carbon tax or any other measure. No single 
recipe however exists for the application of BCAs in compliance with WTO rules. The 
WTO law-consistency of the inclusion of imports in an ETS will be decided by WTO 
adjudicative bodies on a case-by-case basis, and the outcome of each case will be 
predetermined by the concrete design of the scheme. 
 
4.2 Export rebates 
In addition to the inclusion of imports in a national ETS, the playing field between 
domestic and foreign producers could also be levelled through export rebates (export-
side BCA). This could be done through the reservation of some percentage of emissions 
allowances in the total allocation of emissions allowances and recycling them to firms 
on exportation.63 Alternatively, export rebates could be provided through the 
reimbursement of costs of emissions allowances.64  
                                                          
61 See e.g. J Pauwelyn (2007) ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns’. 
62 Brazil-Retreaded Tyres, AB report, para. 227; EC-Seal Products, AB report, paras. 5.299-
5.300. See also R Quick (2000) ‘The Community’s Regulation on Leg-Hold Traps: Creative 
Unilateralism Made Compatible with WTO Law through Bilateral Negotiations?’ in M. Bronckers and R. 
Quick (eds), New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson 
(Kluwer Law International) at 254; J Pauwelyn (2007) ‘U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness 
Concerns’, at 43. 
63 See Art. 29:5 of the 2007 version of draft Proposal amending the EU ETS Directive. 
64 In that case, the calculation of adjustment level may present a problem, given that some 
emissions allowances were distributed for free and others were purchased on a secondary market at 
various prices. 
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Unlike the inclusion of imports in an ETS, which mainly falls under the GATT 
non-discrimination rules (MFN and NT), the adjustment of the ETS requirement on 
exportation will primarily be regulated by WTO subsidy rules. Like the import-side 
border adjustment, the border adjustment on exportation is possible only for indirect 
taxes.65 Rebates of direct taxes will be deemed to constitute a prohibited export 
subsidy.66 As already discussed, it is uncertain whether the ETS requirement can qualify 
as an indirect tax or a tax at all. If the ETS requirement qualifies as a domestic 
regulation, its WTO-compliance will be assessed against general rules of the ASCM.  
If the ETS requirement is found to be an indirect tax, it will be eligible for 
adjustment on exportation subject to the requirement that they are given ‘not in excess’ 
of surrendered allowances or incurred costs.67 Exports rebates would fail to meet the 
‘not in excess’ requirement under an ETS with the free allocation of emissions 
allowances. It also seems difficult not to provide exports rebates ‘in excess’ under an 
ETS with auctioning of allowances, given that allowances can also be acquired at 
various prices on a secondary market.68 
The issue of likeness of carbon-intensive and low-carbon products can also be 
relevant. Ad Article XVI of the GATT and footnote 1 to the ASCM do not consider the 
‘exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when 
destined for domestic consumption…’ an export subsidy (italics added). As carbon-
intensive and low-carbon products may qualify as like, to avoid an allegation of export 
subsidy, export rebates need to be given at a rate that corresponds to the lowest level of 
emissions in the industry (e.g. based on the benchmark of the best available 
technology69).  
Moreover, the issue of a prohibited export subsidy may arise, if rebates on 
exportation are given selectively to certain sectors, rather than to all the sectors covered 
by an ETS. The coverage of sectors by export rebates should therefore correspond to the 
coverage of sectors by an ETS.70  
                                                          
65 See e.g. GATT Ad Art. XVI. 
66 US-FSC, Panel report, paras. 7.108 and 7.131. 
67 Both Ad Art. XVI of the GATT and footnote 1 of the ASCM stipulate that ‘…the remission of 
such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a 
subsidy’. 
68 M Genasci (2008) ‘Border Tax Adjustments and Emissions Trading: The Implications of 
International Trade Law for Policy Design’, Carbon and Climate Law Review vol. 1, at 39-41.  
69 R Ismer and K Neuhoff (2008) ‘International Cooperation to Limit the Use of Border 
Adjustment’. 
70 This match is also important for the import-side adjustment. If the sectorial coverage for the 
inclusion of imports in an ETS does not correspond to the ETS coverage of domestic industries, it will 
entail a violation of the national treatment principle.  
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It is important to note that the WTO rules applicable to border adjustment do not 
require implementing a BCA scheme symmetrically on importation and exportation.71 
A country would be free to apply the adjustment only on exportation, combine export 
rebates with the inclusion of imports in an ETS, or limit a BCA scheme only to the 
application of the ETS requirement to imports.72 
Besides the uncertainty about the consistency of export-side BCAs with the 
WTO rules on subsidies, both Gavin Goh (2004) and Julia Reinaud (2009) allude to the 
problem of environmental integrity of export rebates.73 They argue that export rebates 
of emissions costs are not consistent with the ‘polluter pays’ principle and contrary to 
the climate policy objective of emissions reduction.74 This may create a hurdle for 
justification of a BCA scheme consisting of both import-side and export-side border 
adjustment under the environmental exception clause of GATT Article XX.75 At the 
same time, one could argue that the purpose of export rebates is to prevent carbon 
leakage and thus reduce global emissions.76 In this sense, export rebates contribute to 
the environmental objectives. 
In sum, the adjustment of ETS requirement on exportation, be it in the form of 
remission of emissions allowances or compensation of emissions allowances costs, is 
characterized by legal uncertainty. It raises the issue of a prohibited export subsidy and 
reduces the chances for a BCA scheme to be justified under the GATT exceptions as a 
measure taken for environmental purposes. 
 
5.  International emissions trading 
After the examination of WTO-consistency of various design features of a national ETS, 
this section turns to discuss WTO law issues that might arise from emissions trading 
among countries. International emissions trading can emerge as a result of linking 
arrangements among different national ETSs or as a flexibility mechanism under 
existing or potential international climate agreements. 
                                                          71 K Holzer (2014) Carbon-related border adjustment and WTO law, at 78-80. See also K 
Holzer, ‘Proposals on carbon-related border adjustments: Prospects for WTO Compliance’ (2010) 
Carbon and Climate Law Review, vol. 4(1), at 62-64. 
72 Ibid.  
73 G Goh (2004) ‘The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the 
Border’, at 405; J Reinaud (2009), ‘Would Unilateral Border Adjustment Measures be Effective in 
Preventing Carbon Leakage?’ in Climate and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World (UNEP) at 74. 
74 Ibid. The reimbursement of emissions costs can encourage the expansion of carbon-intensive 
production for exports. 
75 G Hufbauer et al. (2009) Global Warming and the World Trading System (Washington DC: 
Peterson Institute for International Economics) at 69. 
76 Ecoplan et al. (2013) ‘Border tax adjustments: Can energy and carbon taxes be adjusted at the 
border?’, a study prepared for the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), at 99. 
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As ETSs are spreading among countries,77 linkages among different ETSs through 
the acceptance of allowances from different jurisdictions could be established and a 
global carbon market could emerge.78 Moreover, the EU ETS is linked to the emissions 
credits systems under the Kyoto Protocol. Credits earned by companies under Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects are accepted in 
a limited quantity for achieving compliance under the EU ETS.79 
Linking of ETSs is crucial for achieving the maximum efficiency of emissions 
reductions and minimizing carbon leakage.80 However it is not an easy task given the 
differences between ETSs in terms of size, sectorial coverage, stringency of emissions 
reduction targets and other design features.81 To preserve the environmental integrity of 
its ETS, a country would need to use certain conditions or criteria for linking. Countries 
may also condition the admittance of emissions allowances on countries’ commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol or a post-Kyoto international climate agreement.82 Such 
conditions could be established either unilaterally through the inclusion of the clause in 
the ETS legislation specifying the condition for acknowledging other countries’ 
emissions allowances, or bilaterally/plurilaterally through the conclusion of a mutual 
recognition agreement (MRA) over the ETS-related issues with other countries.83 
Restrictions on admittance of emissions allowances issued in other jurisdictions 
could potentially trigger violations of WTO non-discrimination rules, particularly the 
MFN principle. Depending on whether emissions allowances could qualify as 
commodities or services or not, violations would be direct or indirect. For instance, if an 
emissions allowance is a financial service (e.g. ‘negotiable instrument’), restrictions on 
the eligibility of emissions allowances can be challenged under the market access 
provisions of GATS Article XVI:2(b) if a country imposing such a restriction undertook 
in this sector a specific commitment not to limit market access on the basis of ‘the total 
                                                          
77 Besides the EU, ETSs have also been established in Switzerland, Norway, New Zealand, 
Australia and some US states and Canadian provinces. See A Tuerk et al. (2009) ‘Linking Emissions 
Trading Schemes’, at 7. 
78 The EU ETS legislation foresees linking of the EU ETS with ETSs of countries that undertook 
quantified emissions reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Annex B countries) through the 
mutual recognition of emissions allowances. See Art. 25.1 of Directive 2003/87/EC. The EU ETS is 
already linked with the Norwegian ETS and preparations are being made to link it with the Swiss ETS. 
79 See Directive 2004/101/EC (‘EU ETS Linking Directive’). 
80 A Tuerk et al. (2009) ‘Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’, Climate Strategies, at 4-5. 
81 Some schemes are based on an absolute cap, while others use the benchmark of emissions 
intensity; some are based on the free allocation of emissions allowances, while others foresee allocation 
through an auction. 
82 J Werksman and J Lefevere (1999)’WTO Issues Raised by the Design of an EC Emissions 
Trading System’, Scoping Paper no. 3, at 9. 
83 A Tuerk et al. (2009) ‘Linking Emissions Trading Schemes’, at 2-3. 
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value of service transactions or assets in the form of numerical quotas’.84 Yet, even if 
emissions allowances do not fall within the scope of the WTO Agreement, origin-based 
restrictions on the admittance of allowances have the potential to hamper sales of 
products or services and thus may entail violations of the MFN or NT rules of GATT or 
GATS.  
However, if restrictions on the eligibility of emissions allowances for compliance 
were based on some objective criteria that are fixed in MRAs, it is unlikely that they 
would raise issues under the MFN and NT rules.85 Furthermore, restrictions based on 
objective criteria, such as stringency of emissions caps, can be justified under the 
general exceptions of GATT or GATS as measures taken for health or environmental 
purposes or with the objective to secure compliance with domestic laws that are not 
themselves inconsistent with WTO rules.86 
Moreover, an international emissions trading can also be established under an 
international climate agreement.87 It will imply a state-to-state transfer of units within 
countries’ emissions caps (emissions reduction targets). Such an option was available 
for Annex B Parties of the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. countries with emissions reduction 
commitments) under the first commitment period. Under Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, countries that have spare emission units (i.e. emissions amounts permitted to 
them but not used) can sell their excess of emissions rights to countries that experience 
difficulties to meet their emissions reduction commitments. 
As it is not clear whether an international emissions trading system will be 
established under the post-2020 international climate agreement, it is difficult to draw 
definitive conclusions about the WTO-compatibility of this mechanism. It is also 
unclear whether a state-to-state emissions trading will fall within the scope of the WTO 
Agreement. On the one hand, it can be argued that a state-to-state transfer of emissions 
units merely implies a re-allocation of sovereign obligations under an international 
                                                          
84 J Werksman and J Lefevere (1999) ‘WTO Issues Raised by the Design of an EC Emissions 
Trading System’, at 10. 
85 We have to admit though that the compliance of MRAs themselves with the MFN principle 
can be a matter of discussion. See W Davey and J Pauwelyn (2000) ‘MFN Unconditionality: A Legal 
Analysis of the Concept in View of its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular 
Reference to the Issue of “Like Product”’ in T Cottier, P Mavroidis and P Blatter (eds.), Regulatory 
Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law (University of Michigan Press). 
However, entering into MRAs is widespread practice and no complaints in the WTO have been made so 
far.   
86 J Werksman and J Lefevere (1999) ‘WTO Issues Raised by the Design of an EC Emissions 
Trading System’, at 17-19. 
87 For instance, it could be done under a follow-up implementation protocol to the post-Kyoto 
international climate agreement concluded by UNFCCC parties in December 2015.   
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treaty.88 On the other hand, if a state-to-state emissions trading affects a competitive 
relationship between domestic and foreign producers (e.g. where it involves the 
exchange of credits among private legal entities, like the use of credits earned under the 
Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation projects, or affects the price 
of allowances of a domestic ETS), it could become an issue of scrutiny under WTO 
rules.  
 
 6. Conclusions 
WTO compliance is an important consideration in the debate regarding design elements 
of an ETS. Considerable research has been devoted to this area. However, no study can 
predict with confidence the outcome of scrutiny of an ETS under WTO law. There are a 
few reasons for that.  First, an ETS does not have a fixed design and design elements 
significantly vary with a scheme. Second, ETS-related issues have never been raised in 
WTO disputes and have not been tested thus far. This adds uncertainty to the analysis of 
compliance of emissions trading with WTO rules.  
The design measures of an ETS that seem most likely to be challenged under WTO 
law include the free allocation of emissions allowances, recycling of ETS revenues to 
domestic producers, the inclusion of imports in an ETS and emissions allowance rebates 
on exportation. They raise issues under the GATT non-discrimination rules and ASCM 
disciplines on subsidies (see Figure below). The availability of exceptions for 
justification of these measures is therefore of great importance. 
Figure: ETS design elements and WTO issues 
 
                                                          
88 J Werksman and J Lefevere (1999) ‘WTO Issues Raised by the Design of an EC Emissions 
Trading System’, at 6. 
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WTO rules are also relevant in the context of international emissions trading, where 
national ETSs get linked to each other through the mutual recognition of emissions 
allowances, so that allowances issued in one jurisdiction are accepted for compliance 
under an ETS in another jurisdiction. Agreeing on the common design features of ETSs 
of different countries and bringing them into compatibility with each other presents the 
main challenge of ETS linking arrangements. WTO law would apply in this case to the 
terms of the mutual recognition of emissions allowances of different origin. It would 
ensure that conditions for the acceptance of emissions allowances do not negatively 
affect the competitive relationship between domestic and foreign producers or service 
suppliers.  
 
